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Summary 
International Humanitarian Law has at its core distinctions and classifications: The sphere 
between jus in bello and jus ad bellum. Between Civilian and Combatant. Between 
proportional and indiscriminate attack. Between acceptable and prohibited targets. However 
the two most central distinctions in International Humanitarian Law are the distinction 
between War and Peacetime and between International and Non- International Armed 
Conflict. 
This essay will explore the significance of these two distinctions and how they impact the 
application and effect International Humanitarian Law has on war. However it will find that 
war has changed to an extent that it no longer fits into the established classes. These 
distinctions are arbitrary, dated, and inflexible serving not to help implement the law but to 
hinder its application and so fail it’s object and purpose of mitigating all suffering in all 
forms of war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Abbreviations  
AP   Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
CA 3   Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions 
ECHR   European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
FSA    Free Syrian Army 
GC    Geneva Convention 
IAC    International Armed Conflict 
ICRC   International Committee of The Red Cross 
ICTY    International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IHL    International Humanitarian La 
IHRL    International Human Rights Law 
IZAC    Internationalized Armed Conflict 
NIAC    Non-International Armed Conflict 
POW    Prisoner of War 
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I.  Introduction  
In the year 2012 internal armed conflict claimed 37,576 lives. Those individuals died in 
battles all over the world, in conflict of an internal nature waged between factions, 
governments, soldiers, militias, freedom fighters and rebels. But that number pales in 
comparison to the number of lives lost in the true wars: the potentially devastating 
International Armed Conflicts between States and their highly organised and lethal 
established armed forces. That number was 365.
1
 
In modern times the state of war has shifted. Wars used to be fought between States with the 
stakes being much higher and the casualty list much longer. Single States have the power to 
unleash billions of dollars of war machinery and hundreds of thousands of personnel 
operating globally, turning land, sea and air into conflict arenas. So when two of these powers 
clash the potential for destruction is almost unbearable to consider. The world has already 
seen these scenarios play out in the 20
th
 Century and the effect was so great as to unite all 
States and more impressively, all political sides, into taking solid steps to prevent the next 
‘War to end all Wars’. The Geneva Conventions were ratified; Hague Rules codified and 
International Humanitarian Law clearly established and brought to prominence. International 
Human rights law was also jumpstarted and human lives everywhere were held to their 
inherent and equal value.
2
 The period since then has seen numerous Humanitarian Law 
instruments adopted, weapons decommissioned, Tribunals established, and practices 
changed. The law has made great progress in its aim of mitigating human suffering in war.
3
 
And in truth, the number of casualties has dropped astoundingly
4
 and today true State to State 
International Armed Conflict is rare. But, war has changed. The humanitarian legal system 
has seen the demise of the style of conflict it was born out of. A new style is now being 
played out. Not between vast armies in the Fields of Flanders or shores of Normandy, but in 
markets of Bagdad, the playgrounds of Homs, the village centres of South Sudan. Civilians, 
soldiers and fighters are dying in these conflict scenarios yet few of these fit the conflicts 
                                                          
1
 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen,  “Armed Conflicts , 1946-2012” (July 2013) 50(4) Journal of Peace 
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2
 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights , 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), Article 1 
3
 Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2
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 Edition, Oxford University Press, 
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4
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envisioned by the Geneva Conventions. These conflicts then fall to unclear and inadequate 
regulation by the regime seen as “lex specialis” to regulate conflict. 
This thesis aims to explore the deficiency of International Humanitarian Law, and indeed 
international law, in protecting victims and applying to war in the current age. In particular 
the biggest failing encountered is the obsession with classification of conflicts and the 
inflexibility of the hard law itself. 
The current International Humanitarian Law (IHL) regime distinguishes between three main 
scenarios. International Armed Conflict (IAC), Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), 
and situations falling short of armed conflict entirely. While this system was apt in the period 
it was drafted and reflected the world at the time it contains a structure of unnecessary 
distinction and strict classification which is at odds with the relevant aim to be achieved, that 
of mitigating the suffering of war. This thesis aims to show that the distinction between 
conflicts results in lopsided protection, unclear law for both lawyers and soldiers on the 
ground, and that the tests involved are inflexible and often lead to misclassifications or 
inadequate protection. It will also be seen how this structure of distinction is further irrelevant 
and harmful as war is no longer split between two categories, but into multiple categories and 
controversial classes some not even envisioned in IHL.
5
 Additionally the lines drawn that 
distinguish armed conflict and the triggering of IHL from “peace time” internal disturbances 
are overly strict and inflexible, meaning the law is ill-suited to the fluid and evolving 
scenarios, excluding situations that should otherwise merit IHL application.  
The distinctions and archaic classifications and their flaws will be broken down into the two 
main scenarios where they operate.  
First, the distinction between peacetime and armed conflict, with a particular focus on the 
inflexibility of the threshold tests that signal the evolution of internal disturbance to NIAC.  
Second, the distinction between IAC and NIAC, its irrelevance, lop sided protection and ill 
suitability to the multiple new forms of conflict.  
Ultimately these distinctions result in a failure to achieve the object and purpose of IHL, the 
mitigation of human suffering and regulation of conflict, by providing imbalanced protection, 
overly legalistic assessments, inflexibility in response to realities and unclear rules for both 
                                                          
5
 Sylvain Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual 
situations’ (March 2009) 91(873) International Review of the Red Cross 69, 83  
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academics and soldiers. This work will conclude by looking to ways forward to develop the 
law and the possibility of using International Human Rights Law (IHRL) to plug the gaps.  
First however it is necessary to examine briefly the current sources of the law, and 
demonstrate the functioning of the system as it stands today. 
II. The Law 
As with most areas of law, International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) have generally been retroactive, often inspired by severe events. The American Civil 
War gave rise to the Leiber Code on the conduct of hostilities and the battle of Solferino 
famously inspired the Red Cross movement and the Geneva Law system
6
. The most 
prominent laws governing warfare and conflict today are the four Geneva Conventions (GC) 
of 1949 inspired by the atrocious events of the Second World War. The first three of these 
mainly built on pre-established protections set out in prior treaties but all four importantly 
shifted the base of International Humanitarian Law from an interstate system to an 
international homocentric system.
7
 They introduced rules on individual criminal 
responsibility and the concept of grave breaches and fundamental protections. International 
Armed Conflict as a category has remained unchanged and is now extremely regulated both 
from a jus ad bellum and jus in bello perspective. What is necessary to know for a discussion 
on conflict classification is the applicable law to conflict and when the vast rules of the 
Geneva Conventions triggered. When is a situation an IAC or NIAC and what applies?  
As Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions states: 
“In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them.” 
In essence IACs are rather simple. When two States (the High Contracting Parties) clash with 
armed force, the situation is an IAC and the full system of Geneva rules and regulation is 
                                                          
6
 Theodor Meron, The Making of International Criminal Justice : The View  from the Bench: Selected Speeches 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 19 
7
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triggered. As the ICTY put it: “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States”.8 
When it comes to NIACs and their place in International Humanitarian Law however the 
applicable law is more complex. First, a threshold must be reached whereby a situation has 
developed (or deteriorated) into such a state as to be distinguished from mere internal 
violence or disturbance. This rather less clear and concrete trigger and the pitfalls and impact 
of this threshold test will be examined in a later section. Second, the full raft of measures 
contained in the Geneva Conventions do not apply to NIACs even once that threshold has 
been passed. Only Common Article 3 (CA 3) and Additional Protocol II (AP II) contain 
provisions which apply to cases of internal conflict. 
Common Article 3 applies to armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. It provides a fundamental layer of protection 
to persons taking no part, or who are no longer part, in the hostilities. It allows the ICRC to 
become involved, and encourages the parties to make agreements to abide by the other 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. It is a widely applicable article, essentially ensuring 
some minimum of protection
9
 in any scenario that has reached the threshold of armed 
conflict. However it is still only a measure of minimum protection, open to interpretation 
with few explicit rules and little regulation of actual the conduct of the hostilities on a par 
with the provisions on IACs. 
The second layer of law applicable in internal armed conflict is Additional Protocol II. It 
contains more detailed and specific provisions, however still does not regulate the actual 
conduct of the hostilities to a level comparable with IACs. The content of the protocol is 
limited to basic provisions of humane treatment and humanitarian protection of the wounded 
and sick and the civilian population. It also has a higher threshold of application than CA 3 
by requiring that the non-state actors be “under responsible command, exercise such control 
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 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
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9
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over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol”.10 
This higher threshold of internal conflict, itself creating a further distinction and classification 
within NIACs, has made AP II technically inapplicable to many armed conflicts in which the 
government has become ineffective and where warring parties fight each other. These will 
often be the most brutal and arguably the most in need of regulation and International 
Humanitarian Law applicability. 
What is the rationale behind this divide between international and internal conflicts? 
In essence the distinction between NIAC and IAC doesn’t have a humanitarian principle 
behind it.
11
 The reality is that the two were split by the concerns of States that the application 
of the rules governing IACs to internal conflicts would impact the status of parties to any 
internal conflict rising within their borders.  
The Domestic Law of every State gives privilege to its police and military forces against 
those who threaten the society or State and they want to preserve that privilege. Application 
of the rules governing IACS may upset that. State forces are accorded a particular status by 
the rules of IHL, combatant status, which give them a right to participate in the hostilities. 
This entitles them to Prisoner of War (POW) status and its protections, to use force and 
immunity from prosecution for their belligerent acts. If internal armed conflicts were 
accorded the same rules as IACS then those that rebel against the State would also be granted 
this special status and so have a right to use force against the State and the State would not 
have the ability to prosecute them for acting against it. Therefore the distinction between the 
internal and international was made.
12
 However despite these concerns, this distinction has 
led to an imbalance in the law and complicated the application of IHL, which is what will be 
explored in this essay.  
Customary Law also figures in the regulation of conflicts, and in particular has made a great 
effort to apply to both classes of conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has conducted a comprehensive study on the relevant customary law and found a 
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 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Article 1 
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great deal of IAC provisions now apply to NIACs.
13
 However a complete transplant has not 
occurred
14
 and customary law has its downsides compared to more concrete forms of hard 
law in that it is open to dispute and contestation, as can be seen by the United States’ 
criticisms of the methodology of the ICRC study.
15
 This thesis will refer in part to the role of 
custom, however the main focus will be on the more strict forms of hard law. While custom 
fulfils a role in ensuring adequate protection and regulation is applicable to all forms of 
conflict, the continued existence of the distinctions and thresholds set by the Geneva Law 
creates dispute and conflict within the law itself and continues to have negative consequences 
for its application. Additionally one could argue that the applicability of IAC provisions to 
NIACs via custom is itself evidence that the distinction between the two is unnecessary and 
an obstacle International Humanitarian Law has to overcome to achieve its objective of 
reducing suffering in war. 
When speaking of the protections of IHL it should be noted that the general principles of 
armed conflict that guide the regulation of IACS do also apply via custom to NIACS.
16
 For 
the purposes of this essay the disparities and distinctions in protection between the two will 
largely be focused on the Geneva Law provisions and the complications and disputes 
associated with classifying the conflicts to establish which law is applicable. While under 
Geneva Law there is a glaring imbalance between the two, custom and principle has ensured 
that there are fundamental guarantees and protections active in NIACS. 
Finally an analysis of International Humanitarian Law cannot be complete without the 
realities of how the hard law has been applied and interpreted. The jurisprudence of various 
tribunals reveals the problems and limitations and inflexibility of the hard law. In particular 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Tadić judgments 
consider many of the issues of conflict classification and their distinct rules, and the legacy of 
these judgments has shaped the development of IHL.  
International Human Rights law equally has a role to play. This, along with domestic law, is 
the regime that governs those situations that fall short of an armed conflict, internal or 
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 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Customary International Law’ (ICRC and Cambridge 
University Press 2005, 2009) 
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 ICTY, Tadić Interlocutory Appeal (n 8) para 126 
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 John B. Bellinger, III and William J. Haymes II, ‘A US government response to the International Committee 
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international. Human Rights Law remains applicable in times of conflict however IHL is lex 
specialis, more suited to governing the situations arising in conflict. The effect of this is that 
Human rights law must be interpreted in light of the more specific and detailed humanitarian 
law. However as will be examined later, Human Rights Law can have some impact on 
conflict regulation. 
Having established the applicable law sources in IHL and the two established classes of 
conflict it is time to see the current state of modern war. 
III. War Has Changed 
The primary change in warfare for the context of this essay is the move away from State to 
State conflicts to NIACs. In 2012 there were 32 conflicts, of which only 1 was international.
17
 
This could be rightly be heralded as an achievement of the jus ad bellum sphere of IHL, 
which has controlled and reduced the resort to force between States, however the reality is 
that now the conflicts being waged are simply of a different sort from those primarily figured 
at the time of drafting the Geneva Conventions. These new internal conflicts carry their own 
thresholds and demarcation process to distinguish them from internal disturbances, yet the 
lines are rarely clear, obfuscating the point at which IHL is applicable. Further despite being 
the predominant form of armed conflict, fewer rules and protections apply than in IACs. 
Another move away from the classic view of conflict as IAC or NIAC is the rise of 
Internationalised conflicts. These will be discussed in more detail but in essence arise from 
the involvement of a foreign State in an internal conflict, creating new challenges in trying to 
fit the resulting mixed scenario into the two tier system and establishing which set of the 
distinct rules should be applied to a situation that fits equally into both.  
The distinction between peacetime operations and armed conflict is also being blurred by the 
role of armed forces in the modern world. The role of the armed forces has expanded from 
traditional operations against foreign State forces, now with the potential for them to be 
deployed in domestic situations from firefighting
18
 to riot control, hostage rescue,
19
 fighting 
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drug wars
20
 to actual combat against internal armed groups. While there are legal thresholds 
and safeguards to ensure military forces are the last resort or are employed more as a 
supporting role there is the reality, especially in the lead up to a NIAC, that they will be 
operating on domestic soil against their own citizens. This has been the case in Syria, Mali, 
Chechnya, even now at the time of writing in Eastern Ukraine.
21
  
These internal scenarios mean that, no matter the motive of the State, the soldiers being 
deployed will be operating under multiple regimes of law: domestic law, International 
Human Rights Law, and International Humanitarian Law. This means it is more necessary 
than ever to have a clear and easily established system of classification in order to ensure that 
the proper action is taken, law is applied, and responsibility established. With several regimes 
of law and levels of humanitarian law in play the task of reconciling these systems, which are 
often at odds with each other, is a hard task for politicians, lawyers and commanders alike. 
Additionally the object and purpose of the armed forces clashes rather obviously with civil 
and human rights laws, therefore the transition from war fighting to law enforcement or 
support is a very difficult change of role. The threshold between peace time operations and 
armed conflict in IHL needs to be able to encompass the multiple roles armed forces carry 
out; ensuring combat roles are not seen as police operations. 
There are also forms of war and use of force which were not envisioned at the time of 
drafting. An example of this is Multiple Objective Armed Intervention. The international 
community has developed a new regime of war based on intervention for the sake of the 
international community and its values.
22
 Peacekeeping, reprisals, sanctions and humanitarian 
intervention are aspects of this new ‘altruistic war’ which, while it lacks the aggression of 
traditional war, can still result in armed conflict. This new frame of war, while primarily an 
issue of jus ad bellum, does affect the laws of war by challenging the regime’s strict IAC or 
NIAC divide. Military operations are rebranded as “control operations”, and are carried out to 
prevent violence, keep protagonists apart or protect populations. War here merges in its 
rhetoric with international security operations. International and Multinational forces operate 
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 Nick Mirnoff and William Booth, ‘DEA intelligence aids Mexican Marines in Drug War’ The Washington 
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13 
 
alongside, or independently from, the internal forces. The actors involved and the exact role 
of the armed forces complicate the distinction and classification of the situation as internal or 
international. Equally the classic threshold and indicators of armed conflict become blurred 
and convoluted, questioning the existence of an armed conflict at all.
23
 
Perhaps the best example of the shifting spectrum of war is on display in the concept of 
“three-block warfare”. The term explains the multiple sides of forces in war. Coined by a US 
General: “In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced 
refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two 
warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting 
a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day… all within three city blocks”.24 
In particular conflict with the traditional view of armed conflict is the realisation now by the 
stronger States of the threat of remote attacks.
25
 Cyber warfare can contain the same 
aggression of a normal attack, it can be a form of espionage, disruption, sabotage, yet there 
are brand new difficulties in identifying the attack itself, its effects and those responsible for 
it. Intensity and Organisation, the central factors used to establish the existence of an armed 
conflict, along with territorial issues are all convoluted in cases where none of it can be 
determined. Strict distinctions and classifications cannot always accurately describe these 
situations. The definition and form of war and armed conflict is evolving, so it is not 
surprising that our classifications are going to have to adapt to it. 
 
IV. The Eroded Distinction 
Modern conflicts have evolved since the interstate wars of the 20
th
 Century and while the old 
classifications remain the relevance and value of the IAC and NIAC divide is weakening. 
One of the most fundamental sources of jurisprudence and development of International 
Humanitarian Law has been the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In 
particular Tadić gave the world the base interpretation of what constitutes an NIAC based on 
Common Article 3 and established the threshold for classifying a situation as an armed 
conflict. In particular Tadić reveals the blurring of the gap in legal theory between IACs and 
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NIACs and can be seen to call in to question the usefulness of the distinction between the two 
when it leads to imbalanced protection. 
A. Tadić: Classifying the Conflict 
The tribunal in Tadić26 was faced with the task of classifying the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia. The accused argued that the court did not have sufficient jurisdiction as Articles 
2 and 3 of the ICTY statute only covered international armed conflicts, maintaining the 
crimes charged occurred in the context of a NIAC. The prosecution took the approach that the 
conflict was international, made so by the involvement of the UN and the international 
community. The Appeals Chamber rejected both these arguments, stating that the conflict 
was both international and internal and it had jurisdiction over both, effectively bypassing the 
hurdle posed by classifying the conflict as one form or the other. Following that, it was up to 
the Trial Chamber to decide on the classification of each of the individual cases and pursue 
them using the relevant regulations.
27
 
Had the Appeals chamber held the whole conflict as international they could have applied the 
full body of International Humanitarian Law to their cases, including the grave breaches 
provisions contained in CA 3. But they would then lose the ability to consider the internal 
aspects of the conflict and to affirm that serious violations of international law committed in 
internal wars are crimes under International Customary Law. By choosing this dual route they 
were able to still apply International Humanitarian Law to NIACs and keep them under their 
jurisdiction. As Meron states, this need to retain jurisdiction over the internal aspects was due 
to the knowledge that the most horrific and intense fighting and breaches occurred in the 
internal aspects.
28
 
It is worth to note that while this approach was creative and provided the court the 
opportunity to apply the law to the fullest, it does seem that it is a clever response to a 
needless problem. One of the points contended here is that the distinction and classification 
between conflicts creates more obstacles and requires those seeking to fulfil the aim of 
International Humanitarian Law, reduction of suffering in conflict, to resort to complicated 
and convoluted interpretations and approaches merely to apply the law to scenarios that 
clearly merit its application. Here the court’s jurisdiction was challenged on the basis that 
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there are two separate types of conflicts and the court can only look at one. The courts 
response was that not only could it could it look at both, but that the conflict had elements of 
both types. If that is the case then what is the distinction actually proving or even attempting 
to achieve. If the law feels that the two types are sufficiently distinct as to require different 
jurisdiction and regulation then how can a conflict be both? This dual approach and its own 
complications will be discussed further but it serves to question the need for a distinction 
between the two conflict classifications.  
B. Tadić: Blurring the Borders  
The main impact of the Tadić decision is that there has been a blurring between the borders 
of IACS and NIACS. This is seen in several ways. 
Firstly, in ICTY jurisprudence there is often no need to determine whether a conflict is 
international or not. The same normative rules govern both kinds aside from the applicability 
of grave breaches provisions.
29
 This can be seen in the Appeal Judgment of Dragomir 
Milosevic
30
 where the Appeals Chamber noticed the Trial Chamber had not made the 
distinction on the nature of the conflict, citing both Additional Protocol I and Additional 
Protocol II without specifying which one applied. The appeals chamber stated: 
“Although the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber should have made a clear 
finding as to the nature of the armed conflict or the applicability of the Additional Protocols, 
the Appeals Chamber finds the references to the relevant provisions of both Additional 
Protocols permissible given they form part of customary international Law and apply both in 
international and internal conflicts.”31 
This is an example of two distinct set of rules, each governing a distinct class of conflict, 
being applied to the same conflict. 
The ICTY has even emphasised the unreasonableness of having a distinction between the two 
where the result is an imbalance in protection. Tadić Appeals chamber:  
“Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton 
destruction of hospitals, churches, museums, or private property, as well as proscribe 
weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and 
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yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed 
violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State? If International Law, 
while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the 
protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should 
gradually lose its weight.”32 
This reaffirms a commitment to the object and purpose of IHL and erodes the value of a 
distinction between the two forms of conflict where result is a loss of protection. As the 
distinction has become increasingly blurred and devalued, it is not surprising that a growing 
number of rules and principles that were exclusive to IACs have been recognised as 
extending to NIACS. An example of this can be found in the expansion of the scope of 
several weapons conventions, rendering them applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts.
33
 The narrow rules on prohibited weapons, while originally only assigned to IACS, 
make little sense not to apply to NIACS. Tadić: 
“Indeed, elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous that 
the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be allowed 
when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own territory. What is 
inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and 
inadmissible in civil strife. This fundamental concept has brought about the gradual 
formation of general rules concerning specific weapons, rules which extend to civil strife the 
sweeping prohibitions relating to international armed conflicts.”34 
One thing that marks these decisions as particularly important for the development of the law 
and the erosion of the dichotomy is that they have succeeded where political will failed.  This 
approach to conflict recognition and the extension of IAC regulation to NIAC regulation was 
proposed at the conference that created Additional Protocol II, yet was voted down.
35
 
Further evidence of the erosion of the divide between the two can even be seen in the hard 
law itself. Additional Protocol I article 1(4) includes those internal conflicts which amount to 
wars of self-determination, colonial revolution and against racist regimes as IACs. So the 
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dichotomy between the two systems is slowly being worn away,
36
 and questions the 
relevance of having two regimes that only serve to obfuscate the simple principles of the 
law
37
. 
Despite the erosion, the questionable relevance and the blurring of the distinct classifications 
of armed conflict, these classes still remain an inherent part of IHL. As such they are still 
applied and their requirements need to be satisfied. This next section will discuss the 
hindrance they cause to satisfying the objectives of IHL both in the distinction between IAC 
and NIAC but also the distinction between internal disturbance and armed conflict.  
V.  From Peacetime to War 
One of the main features of the current International Humanitarian Law regime is that while 
it is self-evident that it should regulate all types of conflicts it is equally self-evident that it 
can only be applicable once the situation actually qualifies as an armed conflict. This is 
spelled out quite clearly in the provisions governing the applicability of the Geneva Law in 
that it will not apply to situations of internal disturbances or riots.
38
 At first this may seem a 
fair situation: a specific set of rules for a specific reality should only be applicable once 
passed into that reality. In order to be classed as a conflict the situation must satisfy the 
definition of armed conflict. However the issue argued here is that the test to satisfy the 
definition of armed conflict now serves as a hindrance. While the definition and trigger for 
IHL in an IAC is simple, the trigger for law applicable to a NIAC is not. It has become 
increasingly legalistic and has led to not only a more complicated classification process, but 
has damaged the object and purpose of the law by excluding certain conflicts and their 
victims from the scope of its definition and thereby from the application of International 
Humanitarian Law . The essential element of this failure is that the process of classifying a 
situation as an armed conflict, as opposed to an internal disturbance, has moved from a 
practical and fact based assessment to an elements test.
39
 Unless certain proposed elements 
are independently satisfied, a situation cannot be designated an armed conflict even when the 
totality of the facts and circumstances cry out for International Humanitarian Law regulation.  
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This section will explore the object and purpose of International Humanitarian Law in 
relation to classifying a situation as an armed conflict along with the evolution of the strict 
elements test. 
A. Object and Purpose of International Humanitarian Law 
Looking at the applicability of International Humanitarian Law as a means to distinguish 
between peacetime (and the applicable legal regime of IHRL) and war time is failing to take 
into account a major purpose and element of International Humanitarian Law: to curtail 
suffering in war. This purpose has been overtaken by the obsessing over identifying the 
demarcation line between peacetime where IHRL applies, and applying the lex specialis of 
wartime International Humanitarian Law. The emphasis is on establishing which system to 
use, forgetting the overall purpose of those systems. The Syrian civil war is an apposite 
example of this which will be explored later. 
As we have seen, the trigger for an IAC in Common Article 2 is a rather simple one. The real 
grey area then lies in when a situation amounts to a NIAC. 
Nothing in the Commentary to CA 3 implies that the drafters wished it to result in limiting 
recourse to armed conflict. What they wanted was to have it be a reliable and highly 
pragmatic remedy to the reality of internal armed conflict, which is more amenable to a 
totality of the circumstance assessment than a technical legal assessment.
40
 In the 
commentary the goal was clear: to maximise the applicability of International Humanitarian 
Law. 
CA 3 was always intended to bring maximum protection and extend as much regulation as 
possible to armed conflicts in general. In early drafting the idea was to extend the whole text 
of the Conventions to apply in internal conflicts. An extra paragraph was added to Common 
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions providing: 
“In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, especially cases of 
civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the principles of the present 
Convention shall be obligatory on each of the adversaries. The application of the Convention 
in these circumstances shall in no way depend on the legal status of the Parties to the conflict 
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and shall have no effect on that status.”41 
 
However while this was the intention legally, the political intent was not of the same mind 
and a more basic and less reaching draft was approved by the States, which is the current 
version of CA 3.
42
 But even in this reduced form the object was always to bring in and enable 
IHL, not to limit it. CA 3’s protection is automatic in its application and is not tied to any 
other condition of reciprocity, preliminary discussions on the nature of the conflict or 
particular clauses.
43
   
Additional evidence of the desire for a wider scope of CA 3 is seen in the drafter’s rejection 
of a more precise definition of armed conflict, or a list of specific conditions to be satisfied 
for one to exist. While commentators did feel that the term “armed conflict” was vague and 
undefined, this was held to be preferable to attaching strict interpretations or conditions on 
the definition in order to ensure legitimate scenarios were not excluded on technicalities.
44
  
B. The Evolution of NIAC recognition 
Given the design for wide applicability and the resulting protection, how then is the 
distinction between NIAC and internal disturbance a hindrance? 
The tests used to classify a situation as an armed conflict have taken an overly legalistic 
approach and moved towards a strict elements test which ultimately limits the applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law, counter to its object and purpose. 
The commentaries to the Geneva Conventions indicate that a totality of circumstances test 
was to be used in assessing a situation and that CA 3 application is not to be dependent on 
particular conditions.
45
 It was to have a maximum sphere of application so following that 
stance, any attempt to classify conflicts or distinguish them must not unduly impede or 
restrict the application of CA 3. 
While the commentaries and drafting process provide some guidelines and discussion on the 
importance of CA 3, the issue was thrown to the front of international discourse by the 
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conflict in the Balkans following the breakup of Yugoslavia. In attempting to extend 
international criminal responsibility to acts committed in NIACS, the identification of the 
demarcation point between armed conflicts was essential not as a matter of policy or theory 
but as a jurisdictional matter. This resulted in the Tadić opinion which was the formative 
opinion on analysing the existence of an armed conflict and the case which set the 
methodology which then evolved into the “elements test”.46 
   
1. The Framework of Tadić 
The ICTY in Tadić originally framed its approach in line with the protective purpose of the 
law. 
47
 It defined a situation of internal armed conflict as: 
“whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organised armed groups or between such groups within a State”48 
This definition of internal armed conflict is widely accepted and is held as the main definition 
and starting point used in conflict assessment today. 
The Appeals Chamber considered armed conflict to have a wide temporal and geographic 
scope, supporting the notion of a widely applicable definition of armed conflict. This led to 
rules of CA 3 being held to apply outside of the theatre of actual combat missions and reach 
beyond the time of the actual hostilities
49
. This broad interpretation of the scope of the law 
enables a wider assessment of the situation on the ground and can cover more acts, more 
locations, and so protect more victims. 
The judgment further shows the tribunal as looking to the object and purpose of the 
Conventions in terms of linking their scope of application with their purpose: 
“In addition to these textual references, the very nature of the Conventions - particularly 
Conventions III and IV - dictates their application throughout the territories of the parties to 
the conflict; any other construction would substantially defeat their purpose.”50 
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However, the Tadić definition’s threshold has a complication for the troops on the ground 
and lawyers in general. In a temporal perspective the test contradicts itself. International 
Humanitarian Law applies ‘from the initiation’ of a non-international armed conflict, but the 
situation can only be gauged as an non- international armed conflict once the violence 
becomes “protracted”, so how are those on the ground supposed to know when International 
Humanitarian Law has begun to apply? They have to make a real time assessment which can 
leave them vulnerable to changing responsibilities and privileges under the law as the 
classification may change before they are aware of it.
51
 
But the biggest issue around conflict recognition is the move from a totality of circumstances 
test to an overly strict elements test in satisfying the Tadić definition.  
2. The Evolution of Tadić 
Originally the Trial Chamber in Tadić took the above definition and the Commentary’s broad 
guidelines
52
 and attempted to set out the parameters of non-international armed conflict. In 
doing so it established the base of the two-pronged elements test which would later become 
the standard approach in establishing the existence of NIACS.
53
 
The Trail Chamber held: 
“The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an armed conflict for the 
purposes of the rules contained in Common Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the 
intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an armed conflict 
of an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose, 
as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-
lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian 
law. Factors relevant to this determination are addressed in the Commentary to Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field...”54 
In addition to identifying intensity and organisation as aspects, the chamber noted that other 
factors relevant to the determination were listed by the commentaries.
55
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This test of intensity of conflict and organisation of the parties was relied on and followed 
by other chambers and cases in the ICTY for several years. However this approach has 
evolved case by case and a more strict and limited approach has been filtered through. What 
was once simply a means of interpreting evidence in the context of two of many factors has 
become a formal test for two sole factors. 
In 2004 Prosecutor v Milošević56 altered the approach to the assessment of an armed conflict. 
Rather than setting out the definition established in Tadić and then looking at the evidence of 
the situation on the ground, and making a decision based on an overall understanding of all 
aspects of the conflict, from participants to methods, time and locations and plenty other 
factors and elements; the Tribunal began to state the definition and then immediately list two 
factors: intensity and organization.
57
 
It was held that:  
“For the purposes of this Motion, the relevant portion of the Tadić test, which has been 
consistently applied within the Tribunal, is “protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups”. This calls for an examination of (1) the organisation 
of the parties to the conflict and (2) the intensity of the conflict.”58 
This approach takes no account of the several other factors mentioned in the Commentary, 
which are cited alongside a call to ensure that CA 3 is applied as widely as possible and 
without a fixation on any specific criteria.
59
 It also ignores several basic factors that should 
seem evident for consideration in conflict assessment, such as government recourse to 
military force and the insurgent’s intent to adhere to the Conventions provisions.  However 
this approach was followed and reinforced in a number of cases. 
The Limaj case
60
 devotes forty-two paragraphs to the analysis of the intensity of the fighting 
and thirty-four to organisation. This had the effect of establishing these factors as more 
consequential and determinative.
61
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In Haradinaj the court formulated its test on past precedent, therefore relying on the previous 
cases and reinforcing their approach as the essential approach. It then focused extensively on 
the facts of the fighting within the aspect of intensity and organisation.
62
 
In Boškoski the ICTY had to make a fresh assessment on the existence of an armed conflict. 
Here the court reaffirmed that the drafters intended for a wide application of CA 3, and 
supported the stance that the factors mentioned were merely examples, not definitive 
elements. However it then proceeded to narrow its frame, following Limaj, and focused on 
organisation and intensity.
63
 The decision to focus on these two is well reasoned, they are 
undoubtedly valuable indicators, and other indicators are not being expressly dismissed. But 
damage arises as default resort to these two in assessing armed conflict gives rise to a 
supposition and stance that there is an inherent weight and importance attached to these two 
as prime indicators. They are the first ones to be considered and take precedence over others, 
almost to the point where they are completely forgotten, or at least are not considered to the 
same extent. The court in Limaj even referred to them as “the two determinate elements of 
armed conflict”.64 In assessing armed conflict the analysis of intensity and organisation has 
become its own strict test. This has the potential to restrict the application of IHL from 
situations that merit it. 
Further evidence that organisation and intensity are evolving into outright factors to be tested 
and satisfied is the deepening of their substance and the development of their own indicators. 
The ICTY has found numerous facts that demonstrate the intensity of a conflict, from ground 
level realities such as number of troops and equipment to external happenings like UN 
Security council involvement. This multitude of facts and indicators are used to prove, not the 
existence of an armed conflict, but the intensity of the fighting.
65
 The organisation factor has 
seen the same development. Originally the analysis of organisation was rather superficial and 
lacking detail with the ICTY looking for a minimum degree of organisation. While Limaj 
may have contributed to the evolution of this strict elements test by elevating the two to the 
status of “determinate factor”, the court still assessed them to find a minimum standard had 
been reached.
66
 But this gradually changed. Organisation gained its own set of indicators and 
factors that needed to be met in order for it itself to be satisfied as a requirement of armed 
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conflict. Boškoski considered five categories of factors which would establish organisation.67 
This, as with intensity,
68
 resulted in the focus shifting from searching for a minimum standard 
of these ‘determinate factors’ to the two being considered independent requirements.69 This 
again takes conflict assessment further away from the highly applicable CA 3 base and into a 
more formalised elements test of two independent determinative factors. 
Common Article 3 was supposed to offer a minimum protection and while of course it is 
necessary to ensure that there is an adequate threshold, a strict test is less than suitable to 
assess the rapidly developing, complex, and often underreported arena of NIACs. The main 
issue of having a strict elements test is that it over-formalises the assessment that takes place, 
narrows down the applicable factors and reduces the flexibility of the law in its application, 
flexibility that is essential when dealing with the real world of war. In a world where NIACs 
are the main form of conflict, with a particular penchant for brutality, an inflexible and 
narrow test can result in a delay in triggering IHL or worse completely exclude the situation 
from regulation, leaving only IHRL and domestic law as the applicable regimes. 
C.  The Harm of a Strict Elements Test. 
One of the main dangers of failing to correctly classify a conflict a situation as a NIAC or 
simply an internal disturbance is the corresponding powers granted to the State. Whether and 
when a State is allowed to respond with combat force to internal dissent is a complex 
question. 
History seems to demonstrate that States err on the side of aggressiveness when they are 
threatened by dissident movements. This is not surprising and expecting a State to wait 
calmly until an opposition has truly formed into something that can pose an effective 
challenge is not practical and is counterintuitive. 
Proponents of a strict elements test argue its merits by claiming that until the elements are 
satisfied the government may only respond with police and law enforcement measures,
70
 
which IHRL regulates. Essentially they are saying that both sides are affected by the non-
classification of the situation as armed conflict. But this only works in the clear examples far 
removed from the threshold of armed conflict. In reality the situation can rapidly develop 
                                                          
67
 ICTY, Boškoski (n 61) paras 199-203 
68
 Laurie R. Blank and Geoffrey S. Corn (n 39)  723 
69
 ibid 722 
70
 Laurie R. Blank and Geoffrey S. Corn (n 39) 739 
25 
 
crossing that threshold at the slightest action or reaction. Having a strict test for that threshold 
flies contrary to the reality of the situations where International Humanitarian Law is 
designed to operate.  
The trigger of IHL application is not just the line between peacetime and war, but it also 
represents the more fundamental demarcation between law and no law at all. Peacetime law 
is general seen as ill-suited to contain the violence, hence the importance of humanitarian 
law. Reluctance to identify armed conflict means that the situation is only governed by 
ineffective laws. It creates a gap in the law, an invitation to unrestricted warfare.  
It should also be noted that the type of governments who will respond with heavy handed 
repression through combat are also the ones who will not feel bound by IHRL norms. 
Leaving government responses to IHRL when International Humanitarian Law is 
championed as the appropriate system to regulate conflict is not an adequate approach. 
International Humanitarian Law is the best regime to apply to regulate government response 
in situations involving armed force and assessing which of these constitute armed conflict is 
best applied through a totality of circumstances assessment. 
An example of how a strict elements test is ill suited to the reality of the situation is in Failed 
and Weak States.  
The conflict which will be waged in a failed State will typically fall below most IHL 
classifications as it is likely to be waged between armed groups. Without any outside or 
internal State forces involved the conflict will not be an IAC and APII will not apply. This 
leaves only CA3 to regulate the conflict. But only if the thresholds are passed. 
The conflict will still have to satisfy the Tadić inspired test of organisation and intensity that 
has become rigid. As discussed above reliance on these two as independent factors is 
problematic and this is on full display in failed and weak State conflicts.
71
 The organisation 
of groups in these scenarios will be basic at best and usually small scale with a local focus. 
Warring factions will be the main players as opposed to a united front or large scale force. 
These groups are equally holding different aims to what traditional armed conflict supposes. 
They have little desire to seize central power, instead aiming for control over local points. 
They have no interested in taking over State functions or responsibility, making them even 
less like traditional anti regime movements. 
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The intensity of the violence also will be difficult to ascertain. With low organisation 
reducing the capability for effective or widespread combat operations the violence fluctuates 
and is often sporadic
72
. Equally, as with their organisation, the motives for violence are 
different from the traditional sphere of war. Warring local groups are less likely to have 
overcoming the enemy as an objective, instead preferring to create chaos and disrupt the 
traditional power balance to prevent the return of an organised system.
73
 
However perhaps the most apt example of this narrow approach to the thresholds of Object 
and Purpose can be seen in one of the most violent and brutal conflicts being waged today. 
One that has seen over 100,000 lives lost, civilians targeted and even chemical weapons 
deployed while the international community debates the classification of the conflict. 
D. Syria 
The timeline of the Syrian Civil War’s escalation from protest movements to civil war is a 
fitting example of the current inflexibility and overly legalistic approach to conflict 
recognition. Before being recognised as an armed conflict the situation was one of internal 
unrest or disturbance: No International Humanitarian Law regime applied and IHRL and 
national law was expected to be the bulwark against violence and conflict, protecting the 
victims and controlling the aggressors. It was only once the coveted threshold of organisation 
and intensity was reached that the International Humanitarian Law regime of internal armed 
conflict, and as we have discussed this has several levels of protection each requiring its own 
assessment and threshold, was able to be applied. 
What originally started as a protest movement descended into chaos. The context of these 
demonstrations was the Arab spring, with government after government being forced out and 
talk of revolution widespread, a context that the world and the Syrian government were very 
aware of. 
The Civil Uprising Stage. 
The unrest, while there had been rumblings in the previous months, started on the 15
th
 of 
March 2011 and continued for the next few months. These protests spanned several cities, 
multiple regions and comprised upwards of 100,000 protesters. The protesters were 
immediately met with security forces deploying water cannons, beatings, warrantless arrests 
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and live ammunition.
74
 While this constituted unnerving and brutal behaviour by an 
authoritarian regime, it is understandably still nowhere near an armed conflict. IHRL is quite 
fairly the applicable law. 
The Military Response 
In April however the Government deployed its military forces. This is undoubtedly a clear 
indicator that a situation is evolving from civil unrest to a scenario requiring the regulation 
IHL provides. The city of Daara was besieged. Hardly a common police tactic for dealing 
with protesters, tanks, live ammunition and 6000 troops engaged
75
 in operations to hunt down 
“terrorist groups”, or protesters depending on the perspective. During April several other 
towns received the same treatment as Daara, at the end of which 1000 people were killed.
76
 
Following this response by the government, military officials and soldiers defected. The first 
armed insurrection occurred on the 4
th
 of June, however this was mainly carried out by militia 
and protesters. Further towns were besieged and on the 29
th
 of July the formation of the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) was announced by defecting officers; comprising armed volunteers and 
ex Syrian army personnel.
77
 Over the following months, more defections from the State 
forces and allegiances from local groups increased the FSA’s numbers and the violence 
escalated. Large scale military operations on towns and residential areas were carried out 
with both sides using heavy weaponry and the State forces employing tanks, gunships and 
mortars.
78
 At this point the situation was still only governed by national law and the State’s 
adherence to its human rights obligations. 
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic was 
established on 22 August 2011 by the Human Rights Council, several months into the chaos 
on the ground. Its reports only serve to highlight the inflexibility and strict application of the 
formalised test. The Commission in its first report in November 2011, while finding gross 
human rights violations, felt that the situation was still not that of an armed conflict as the 
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requisite level of intensity had not yet been reached.
79
  The second report in February 2012 
acknowledged that the violence had increased to a level that could satisfy the intensity 
requirement but the organisation of the FSA was still unascertainable.
80
 However when 
comparable events assessed in early ICTY cases satisfied that threshold, this strict test seems 
to be out of step with the present reality.
81
 Thousands of fighters had perished and both sides, 
in particular the State, were making full use of military tactics and equipment yet the situation 
was still not severe enough to trigger even the base protections of CA 3. 
It was not until July 2012 that the ICRC announced that the situation had risen to a level of a 
NIAC and so triggered IHL application.
82
 Fifteen months of State forces targeting protesters, 
reprisals by militias, denial of humanitarian aid, shelling of residential areas, civilian 
targeting as the regime unleashed its military on its own population in response to a protest 
movement, and then met with force by rebel forces, with no accountability under the IHL 
regime as it did not apply. It simply seems illogical and at odds with the object and purpose 
of IHL that this situation had to descend to such a level, whereas had the conflict been against 
a neighbouring State IHL would have applied from the first shots. Law in general is 
retroactive but considering the wide scope desired in IHL and the almost instantaneous 
application of the law in IACs, the trigger for a NIAC is simply inept.  
VI. The Distinction between NIAC AND IAC 
The difficulties and contradictions in law caused by the demarcation point between peace and 
war have been show above. However there is another hurdle to the realisation of the object 
and purpose of IHL. The imbalance in protection based on a classification within conflict, 
one we have already seen as eroded and at odds with modern warfare. This section will 
explore the complications and deficiencies of the distinction in International Humanitarian 
Law between IACs and NIACs, revealing that the dichotomy is no longer an accurate 
reflection of the current forms of warfare and is lacking in its protection for the most common 
conflicts being fought, NIACS. 
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A. The Imbalance in the Law. 
The advance of nuclear weaponry and the lack of tolerance for direct aggression has had an 
impact on the prevalence and resort to genuine International Armed Conflict. It could be said 
that International Humanitarian Law has fulfilled its role well in relation to jus ad bellum. 
Conflict now is less transparent, with States waging war by proxy such as the US in 
Nicaragua or acting behind an invitation such as Russia in Afghanistan, even relying on the 
fog of war and politics to hide their influence in internal conflicts.
83
  Even Russia’s recent 
takeover of Crimea, an armed annexation of sovereign territory was all done under a claim of 
internal strife, with flagless soldiers, and without a shot fired somehow fell short of both an 
IAC, and due to the previously mentioned flaw in the strict elements test, a NIAC. 
1. The legal differences. 
The first issue with the distinction between the internal and international conflict is the 
imbalance in the regulation and protection. The substantive differences in the law are 
striking, with the weight of the law overwhelmingly focused on the States and their IAC’s. 
The GCs and their protocols contain close to 600 articles, of which only CA 3 and the 28 
articles in AP II apply to NIACs. So to say that there is an imbalance of Geneva Law is an 
understatement. 
The content of these provisions contains a further imbalance in the regulation of the 
hostilities. CA 3 only covers those who are not, or are no longer, participating in the conflict 
meaning it leaves the combatants largely unregulated, and does the minimum to regulate the 
actual combat or protect civilians from effects of hostilities. AP II does provide more 
substance for the protection of civilians, yet it must be remembered that AP II requires a 
higher threshold of organisation in order to be applicable. It seems that civilians are thought 
to have a varying degree of vulnerability, only really threatened when organised (and 
possibly more disciplined and obedient) forces clash. AP IIs protection is also less than that 
of the level applicable in IACS. Its provisions
84
 do not provide the same detail on civilian 
protection such as the provisions on the prohibition of indiscriminate attack
85
, unnecessary 
suffering and environmental damage as contained in AP I. 
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The imbalance in law between the two conflict classes is not just contained to Geneva Law. 
The disparities are also echoed in other legal regimes, such as International Criminal Law, 
where the Rome Statute of the ICC limits the grave breaches regime to international conflicts 
and also contains less comprehensive provisions that apply to non-international conflicts
86
. 
This illustrates that the divide and distinction between the two conflicts, and the ensuing gap 
in protection is being compounded and upheld in international law and, given the fairly recent 
adoption of the ICC statue, show that not much has prompted change or lawmakers aren’t 
motivated to rectify it. 
Perhaps the most drastic difference between the two is the lack of combatant privilege and 
POW status in NIACs. As a result those engaged in an internal conflict against the State do 
not have the right to attack their enemy, the State forces, and they may be charged under 
domestic law to that effect. State forces however have that right and the corresponding 
immunity. From the perspective of the non-state actor, there is little value in IHL as there is 
less regulation over the conduct of hostilities and they merit neither right nor protection of 
combatant status. 
However there has been some move to align the two. While unfortunately nothing as clear as 
strict treaty law convergence or assimilation, custom has attempted to bridge the distinction 
placed between the two. The court in Tadić found that several rules stemming from IACs 
were applicable as custom in NIACS.
87
 Legal experts have also commented on the merge of 
the two bodies and there is some feeling that the opinion juris and practice of States and 
international organisations now supports the finding of criminal responsibility to grave 
breaches of ICL even when committed in a NIAC.
88
 However again it should be pointed out 
that this is not backed by more express forms of hard law and as mentioned above the ICC 
statute in fact goes the opposite way. The ICRC has equally made moves that show the divide 
is becoming less strict, with its acknowledgment that national legislation, international legal 
instruments and judicial reasoning reveal that the States are moving away from a two tier 
structure, yet that organisation still adheres to that system of conflict classification.
89
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2. New conflicts:  IAC or NIAC? 
The next issue is that International Humanitarian Law still dissects conflicts into the two 
categories of IAC and NIAC, with neither regime being appropriate or applicable. The 
current form of war is largely Internationalised Armed Conflicts. 
Despite the critical departure from a formal declaration of war, and the then progressive base 
level of protection provided by CA 3, both the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols fail to dictate what law to apply in a conflict that has both international and non-
international aspect. 
In addition to the confusion around what laws are applicable to internationalised conflicts, the 
test for internationalisation itself is complex and contradictory. 
The Tadić case considered the issue of internationalisation in its Appeal Judgment. The court 
found that: 
“It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more 
States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a 
State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in 
character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict 
through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed 
conflict act on behalf of that other State.”90 
This test for internationalisation has been followed in numerous cases and as with many 
elements of the Tadić case, has become a foundation for legal practice and development on 
the issue. However there is some confusion and overly complex snags with the test that 
render it unsuitable for its purpose. 
One catalyst for internationalisation occurs though combatants acting as agents of an outside 
State to the conflict. Here the jurisprudence on the issue is contradictory and its application is 
convoluted. 
The ICJ considered internationalisation via agency in the Nicaragua case in order to 
determine any responsibility of the United States in the armed conflict where it established a 
test of “effective control” over the operations of the agents.91 In this test it looked to 
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dependence and control and measured those in the light of equating the Nicaraguan Contras 
with an organ of the US or acting on behalf of the US government.
92
 In this case the US was 
not held responsible despite a high degree of control over and dependency by the Contras as 
the violating acts they committed could be committed without control of the US.
93
 Tadić 
made to follow this approach however the Tadić Appeals Chamber overruled the Trial 
Chamber’s support of this test arguing it as unpersuasive as it is not “consonant with the logic 
of the law of State responsibility”94 and is “at variance with judicial and State practice” with 
courts departing from the notion of effective control.
95
 The Appeals Chamber introduced a 
new test with three different standards of control for differing entities.
96
 
In overruling this method the correct approach for internationalisation via agency has not 
only become more contested but the new test proposed by Tadić has found problems in its 
application creating further confusion, even between the Appeals Chamber Judges.
97
 
This confusion and multiple standards of control not only leaves the correct route to 
internationalisation muddled for lawyers and judges, but its most serious impact is on the 
ground. And this is precisely where International Humanitarian Law needs to be the most 
apparent and applicable, if those engaged in the hostilities cannot determine which rules to 
apply then the whole exercise is rather pointless. Courts are able to view the situation with 
not only a complete picture but also in hindsight. Internationalised conflicts are often used to 
employ covert methods of warfare and the information will be largely unavailable to those on 
the ground thereby giving rise to differing views of the conflict.
98
 Expecting commanders in 
the field to employ a test that itself is complex and uncertain and the subject of dispute, in 
real time, with limited information is a tall order. And as one author points out, the other side 
of the responsibility issue is equally ridiculous in that “one could convince a military 
commander to respect a different set of rules by arguing he is an agent of a foreign 
country”.99 Questions such as targeting, and in particular of POW status will remain unclear 
and up for debate until well after the fact, and in the case of punishments levied against those 
taking part in the hostilities, can be irreparable.  
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The complexity and indecision on the issue will also affect external actors seeking to enforce 
humanitarian norms. And on the final stage, the lack of agreement on the test has impacted 
the courts themselves, delaying and muddling their decisions. 
These current tests for internationalisation discussed above are derived from where 
International Law stands on assigning State responsibility, but they are being applied to 
International Humanitarian Law conflict classification, a real time arena that is ever evolving 
and with countless factors interacting that has instant consequences on the lives of those 
involved. They are ill suited to the task and undermine the possibility of consistent 
application of humanitarian norms.
100
 They are largely only even possible to implement when 
looking back in time, and forget the object and purpose of international humanitarian law. Ex 
post facto assessments are of little use to those on the ground, the law should strive to be 
clear and easily interpreted by those actually engaged in the conflict. However as unfit as the 
tests may be, they are operating in a field where both lawyers and soldiers have to view 
conflict as one of two artificial options, which the newly internationalised conflict does not 
fit. 
B. The Effect of Internationalisation 
As we have seen the current view of armed conflict is that it is divided between an IAC or 
NIAC, which itself has two thresholds and applicable rules, the Internationalised Armed 
Conflict (IZAC) sitting in between. And unfortunately for the law and the strict classification 
ideology one conflict can fit into all of those categories. This has led to questions on the 
characterisation of what an internationalised conflict actually entails in terms of the 
applicable International Humanitarian Law. Is it the IAC regime or the NIAC regime? 
Stewart proposes that there is either a global or a mixed approach. 
The Mixed Approach 
The mixed approach to Internationalised conflicts is found once again in Tadić: 
“In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it 
may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in 
character alongside an internal armed conflict)…”101 
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The effect of this approach is that the internationalisation of a conflict only creates an 
international conflict between the parties belonging to States as only they are capable of 
conducting an IAC. So if a third State intervenes in an internal conflict the entire conflict 
does not become international. It only becomes international in respect of the State forces, 
and even then, only when they clash against each other. So a State assisting its neighbour 
government in an internal conflict is still only bound by NIAC rules and the conflict is 
considered an “Internationalised NIAC” … which does very little on the ground as there no 
specific rules governing that type of conflict in current IHL. It is either an IAC or a NIAC. In 
essence the situation has been given a new name but is legally still a NIAC, which begs the 
question as to why even discuss its internationalised nature. 
The rational for this approach stems from the Geneva Conventions themselves. An 
international armed conflict occurs between two high contracting parties (read: States).
102
 
Non International Armed conflict occurs between a State and organised armed groups.
103
 
While it is not illogical to distinguish internal and international, that distinction is no longer 
apposite to view war today and having a disparity in the protection afforded these classes is 
contrary to the aim of IHL. In the decades that have passed we have moved away from a 
State centred and Westphalian attitude towards States and the conflicts seen in the world 
today equally reflect a move away from outright state to state warfare. In keeping with the 
argument that the distinction is at heart irrelevant and does more harm than good this idea of 
two concurrent classifications of conflict results in both jurists and actors on the ground, 
making artificial distinctions between the internal and international aspects of the conflict. 
This process is impractical, convoluted and imprecise.
104
 The impact this mixed approach has 
on the situation on the ground is also largely impotent as it leaves the regulation to the less 
comprehensive NIAC regime, aside from the scenario where an external State is involved 
engaged against the host State, which anyway would be an IAC regardless of the existence of 
the NIAC. And while that approach may seem the cleanest way to view an internationalised 
conflict, it is of no use in scenarios amounting to proxy wars.  
Given the decline in open State to State conflict, proxy wars and covert interference are 
valuable tools which following the mixed approach to internationalisation, fall through the 
gaps resulting in an IAC treated as a NIAC. The interfering State is unlikely to admit to its 
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role due to the political ramifications, after all if it was willing to support the conflict 
publically it would have done so and there would be no proxy or covert operations. Without 
its direct involvement the conflicts cannot even be claimed to be simultaneously an IAC or 
NIAC. The distinction between IAC and NIAC, only compounded by a mixed approach to 
internationalisation, is not accurate to the real situation.  
In effect what this approach calls for is an even more complex layer upon layer system based 
on relationships between troops and states that is only diagnosable after the fact. However for 
those affected by the chaos and violence, the effect of a shell or bullet is rather the same no 
matter who fired it. This approach is echoing the overly legalistic attitude that vexes the first 
stage classification of an armed conflict from an internal disturbance. 
The Global Approach 
The other approach to the effects of internationalisation is the global approach, where the full 
body of International Humanitarian Law is applied to the Internationalised Conflict. The 
arguments for this approach are much the same as the ones against the mixed approach: that it 
is more practical, simpler to apply and removes the artificial distinctions.
105
 Equally from an 
object and purpose perspective applying the full protection and full regulation of armed 
conflict to an IZAC seems the natural response to its internationalisation; otherwise the 
situation is just a NIAC with a new external and irrelevant element. And from the perspective 
of those involved in the conflict it is very prudent to apply the full laws of war in a scenario 
where the classification may rapidly change or even retroactively be changed by a court, thus 
leaving them liable to violation of the laws. 
There is considerable support for the global approach with several cases adopting that view, 
the United Nations Commission of Experts, the United States government and several 
academic scholars have advocated or adopted a blanket classification of State territories 
containing international and internal armed conflicts.
106
 
There is an understandable fear that the global approach would be overly trigger happy, in the 
sense that any incident of international force could be enough to internationalise the conflict, 
even when it is possible to see a clear distinction between the conflicts. It could also 
encourage non state actors to escalate the conflict to prompt international involvement in 
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order to trigger full IHL and the connected combatant privilege. However given the system’s 
current desire to separate, divide and compartmentalise conflicts, there is little reason why it 
would not be possible to establish some limits on the global approach to account for these 
scenarios. 
While the global approach may seem like the more appropriate choice, and its popularity may 
grow with further adoption by States, it still stands as the outside view. The mixed approach 
was taken by the International Community when it adopted the stricter scope of CA 3, and 
rejected the ICRC’s proposal to include full International Humanitarian Law to civil wars 
involving the intervention of foreign troops.
107
 The mixed approach is also the one 
consolidated in the jurisprudence of the ICTY as we have seen. 
The Reverse of Internationalisation 
Aside from the difficulty of cramming IZACS into the distinct IAC or NIAC dichotomy, the 
other side is equally unclear and open to ineffectiveness and confusion. What is the effect 
when a conflict becomes internal again? 
The current stance again stems from the Conventions, Commentary and ICTY. Article 6 of 
GCIV makes the point where International Humanitarian Law ceases to apply on “the general 
close of military operations”.108 This is given a wide interpretation by the commentaries, 
pointing to the last shot being fired and the final end of all fighting.
109
 Once again this results 
in a wide field application of International Humanitarian Law in line with its purpose. But 
what is the status of internationalised conflicts. Given the unlikely result that the full regime 
even applies, does the law applicable scale down to that which covers NIACS once the 
internationalising element has gone? 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber considered the issue and found that: 
“International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, 
in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, 
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States 
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or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or 
not actual combat takes place there.”110 
Given the ICTY’s creation of the “mixed approach” on the effect of  internationalisation it 
stand to reason that the correct interpretation is that the conflicts are dealt with separately 
with the cessation of International Humanitarian Law just as they were with the application of 
it. This means that an IAC can become a NIAC and the rules applicable are those for NIACs. 
This does seem a reasonable effect even from the “global approach” to internationalisation, as 
an internal conflict that could rage long after any international element has left should not be 
deemed international. However given the disparity in level of protection it seems counter 
intuitive to move from a more regulated conflict to a less regulated one.  
It can be argued that the loss of the international element should trigger a reclassification, and 
this would be tenable if the level of protection were somewhat equal, merely tailored to suit 
the involved actors. However this argument for reclassification is not balanced. In a conflict 
where an international element is involved, but not operating against the State, the conflict 
remains classed as internal. How then could proponents of this approach argue the 
importance of the international element is sufficient for reclassification down to a lower level 
of protection when its presence does not move the class up? Additionally it may be in the best 
interest of the victims and the object of IHL to retain a higher level of protection with the loss 
of the International element. In many situations the presence of a foreign armed force may be 
preventing further violence and conflict, the loss of that element would open the gates to 
more vicious fighting and moving to a less comprehensive regime seems an odd response. 
Ultimately internationalised conflicts show that the distinction between IAC and NIAC is no 
longer accurate and nor is it really relevant. What a conflict is called is of little importance to 
those being affected by it. It’s the disproportion of protection and regulation the law provides 
based on that classification. The need to establish first what set of rules applies to a conflict 
only serves to complicate the situation over an arbitrary distinction. And often the conflict fits 
cleanly into neither category resulting in even more arbitrary divides and complex tests, the 
results of which often lower the standard of protection. Were the protection more equal then 
the problems with the test for internationalisation and the confusion over what law applies to 
those internationalised conflicts would be cleared, and indeed the whole need for different 
classes would fade anyway. 
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VII. The Way forward 
The dichotomy of IAC and NIAC is not working. Commentators are disparaging of the 
divide between international and internal conflict.
111
 The distinction itself is outdated, 
arbitrary, unclear and inconsistent in its application, does not take into account current 
warfare, and has barely any effect other than to confuse and complicate the protections 
International Humanitarian Law can provide. The inflexibility of the line drawn between 
peacetime and war is equally damaging, having the effect of excluding IHL where it is most 
needed. However the way forward is not smooth. 
Customary Law has made some inroads into closing the gap the IAC/NIAC distinction has 
caused. Many of the rules applicable in IACS are now applicable in NIACS, however this 
process has not resulted in a full transplant and so creates a further complex web of norms in 
terms of rules applicable to a conflict. Equally the development of custom is a long process 
and will be more open to political and legal dispute. As it stands custom will require more 
consolidation to court widespread acceptance and equally requires more expert legal 
knowledge when imparting these rules to those actually engaged in the hostilities. Is there a 
route to progress through Treaty Law? 
One of the major obstacles to the Treaty law route is the difficulty of drafting a single 
definition of armed conflict that accurately encompasses the multiple levels of armed 
conflicts and satisfies the governments concern of being able to deal with internal matters. 
Given the erosion of absolute State sovereignty in the development of international law it 
could be argued that while internal matters are of course the States prerogative, once the State 
chooses to deploy armed forces and finds itself in an armed conflict it should agree that it is 
bound by a higher law, just as it would be over human rights violations, an equally internal 
issue. 
If drafting a new definition of armed conflict proves too troublesome, the same effect can be 
achieve by simply correcting the imbalance between IACs and NIACs. This unfortunately 
will not solve the complexities and grey areas around the transition of an internal situation to 
an armed conflict and the general application of IHL, but it will ensure that all armed 
conflicts merit the same protection and remove the confusion created by IZACs. Several 
initiatives of this balancing act have already been mentioned: the finding by Tadić of the 
                                                          
111
 James G. Stewart (n 36)  344 
39 
 
applicability of some IHL provisions to internal conflicts, the ICRC customary law study, and 
the lack of distinction between conflicts in arms conventions. There have even been drafts at 
comprehensive legislation for NIACS, such as the San Remo Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict.
112
 Experts have also made efforts to draft Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards whose application is not limited by type of conflict.
113
 
However there are unfortunately some areas that will create controversy and tension in any 
attempt to harmonise the law of IACs and NIACs. The monopoly of force and combatant 
privilege are closely guarded by States and POW status is equally a feature they would wish 
to preserve as their own for fear of enabling their opponents in internal conflicts or limiting 
their ability to deal with their internal matters.  
The States protectiveness over POW status cannot be underappreciated. In principle it 
legitimises raising arms against the State and therefore lends validation to not only attacks on 
the State, but the armed group and its movement against the State. However this effect can be 
limited. Applying the conditions for militia listed in 4A(2) of GC III to actors in internal 
conflicts would result in certain criteria to be met before gaining POW status and so the State 
will not lose the right to prosecute all members of the opposing force. It would also aid 
inspiring organisation and discipline and respect of the law from the actors. Additionally 
POWs can still be prosecuted for aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide 
which further can curb the fear that a lack of prosecution will inspire rebellion. Regardless, 
States are very unwilling to release their monopoly on force and as some see it, limit their 
own sovereignty by being bound in their handling of internal matters. 
This in essence is the biggest obstacle to reforming international law through treaty or statute: 
political will. International Humanitarian Law represents the extreme end of the spectrum of 
International Law where the most fundamental interests and even the very survival of a State, 
not to mention the power and authority of those individuals giving the orders and drafting the 
policy, are at stake.
114
 So it is not surprising that States will work in their own favour in 
designing the rules they consent to be bound by. Additionally IHL Organisations, such as the 
ICRC hold on to the current system and distinctions. Indeed due to these obstacles it is 
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actually most likely through that aforementioned development of customary law, and a 
continued erosion of the value and relevance of the distinctions, particularly between IAC 
and NIAC, that progress towards a more inclusive and balanced system will be made. 
A. Progress Beyond the Law 
New treaty law, development of custom or reform of the current IHL provisions may not be 
the only way forward. While the politics and policy of law-making can pose a problem to the 
development of International Humanitarian Law there is some ground from which progress 
can, and has been built. Very few States will openly deny the humanitarian imperative in 
armed conflict.  All members of the UN have ratified at least the Geneva Conventions, and 
while a significant number have not ratified the AP II, they are still bound by CA 3, so some 
level of regulation of NIACs is in play. The way forward then is to take a more practical 
route and entrench International Humanitarian Law within not only the societies, hopefully 
including those in power who wish to wage war or support it, but within the Military 
Institutions themselves.
115
 
There are several advantages to ingraining International Humanitarian Law norms, and the 
Military Institutions are the perfect targets. There is the obvious factor that they are the ones 
who participate in conflicts and therefore are the intended subjects of the effects of the law; 
their comprehensive and full understanding knowledge and acceptance of the laws of war is 
rather the point. But as Carswell notes, Militaries also evaluate and define themselves on 
discipline. Law, and in particular International Humanitarian Law, is in essence an exercise 
of discipline, a set of rules designed to control behaviour and action in a chaotic environment. 
One perspective is that by equating Law and discipline creates the notion that falling short of 
the International Humanitarian Law practices and principles means a lack of discipline. 
Adherence to IHL is therefore of inherent value to military institutions. Taking that view is a 
method of encouraging strict and full compliance with International Humanitarian Law.
116
 
However there are some flaws in this approach. One disadvantage in particular is that 
encouraging strict discipline to the current system misses the central theme of this work: that 
the current system doesn’t fit in today’s wars. A second is that it has been strict adherence to 
the distinctions and classifications within IHL that have led to a dissonance with the reality 
on the ground. So while it is a valuable connection to make between the two in respect of 
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fostering value for general IHL compliance, what is needed is more flexibility, for soldiers 
and commanders to think beyond arbitrary lines and to apply the object and purpose of 
International Humanitarian Law to all conflicts. 
Another move that again lies with the Military institutions is simply to just ignore the current 
imbalance of protection and apply full IHL to both internal and international conflicts. This 
has the advantage of removing any confusion as to which rules apply, conforms to the object 
and purpose of the law and reduces the risk of those involved being held to a higher standard 
of law if the conflict evolves or is found ex post facto to be of a different class.  
One of the constraints on the above approach of a military incorporating International 
Humanitarian Law into its core policy is that, no matter its stance, it remains a servant of the 
State and its Government and so will be unable to separate itself from the political 
considerations that give rise to the problems of conflict classification.
117
 But this doesn’t 
mean every detail of its actions must conform to the political ambition. It can still implement 
as much of the International Humanitarian Law protections as it can in its own operational 
practice. It can still give substantial effect to the object and purpose of International 
Humanitarian Law and conform itself to the full regime even if politicians are refusing to 
recognise the belligerency of the opposition. The military can hold itself to a higher standard 
than is required by law. Indeed the argument could be made that many laws are setting 
merely minimum standards of behaviour. Truthfully, individuals and States should be aiming 
a bit higher than the bare minimum in protecting humans from suffering. The UN has done 
this in relation to its peacekeeping troops by holding that they will conform to the full IHL 
regime no matter the external politics and their impact on conflict classification.
118
 
Ideally best way to implement International Humanitarian Law through the military is full 
integration of the law in all aspects and levels, from training, to policy, establishing its 
principles as doctrines and as a foundation in internal justice systems.
119
 By entrenching the 
highest standard of law, such measures can at least insulate the military from the politics or 
legal sophism of classification. This will not only result in the higher standards of protection 
being applied to conflicts, but protect soldiers from the consequences of an subsequent 
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reclassification and has the potential to consolidate and strengthen the Customary Law on the 
issue. 
There are limitations to leaving the military to fortify International Humanitarian Law. 
Essentially, they shouldn’t have to. The legal experts and the law itself should hold the 
responsibility to safeguard its clarity and effectiveness and ensure its connection to reality.  
Additionally there are some elements in IHL where the military has little power. An example 
of this is combatant privilege. No matter their treatment by the armed forces, those non state 
actors involved in NIACS under the current law will still be liable to prosecution and the 
States seem unlikely to give up this right. Equally if the political forces within a state begin to 
interfere with army practice there is little the military can do to contradict them. An example 
of this would be creating a new class of detainee, such as an “unlawful combatant.”120 The 
solution also requires the politicians and civilians to fully understand, appreciate and be 
motivated by International Humanitarian Law.  
On this vain the focus should then shift to the lawyers. One professor of IHL has made the 
argument that the teaching of the law should be updated. It should be more general and move 
away from immediately stating the various conflicts as fixed inflexible classes. This roots the 
discussion solely in when IHL is applied, not when it should be. The focus needs to open on 
asking the students in what situations should IHL be applied. What changes those conflict 
situations enough to merit a change in the applicable law?
121
 Ask students what suffering 
should be covered, rather than starting at what Tadić defined and move from there. In 
teaching these distinctions professors and experts should emphasized that the distinctions and 
categories are just that – legal distinctions – and do not define the suffering of peoples who 
are affected by the violence and conflict, nor do they define the appropriate response to such 
tragedies.
122
 
Carswell very effectively sums up the route for progress: “The legal framework applicable to 
military operations is patchwork and contains overlapping provisions which may also 
conflict. It is liable to political interference and can become complex to the point it is 
ineffective. The substantive provisions are simple and straightforward however. Politicians 
must become conservant with the legal framework applicable to military operations if they 
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are to respect the requirement for objective legal classification. Civilian and military officials 
must speak the same language and understand the rationale behind the States voluntary 
decision to abide by International Humanitarian Law and non derogable IHRL in even the 
most trying times. Only then can the theory of law be genuinely applied in practice.
123
 
B. Another Source of Conflict Regulation? 
The IHL reform discussed above, such as a new single definition of armed conflict, or a 
harmonising of laws between conflict classes, focus mainly on minimising the negative 
impacts of having a distinction between IAC and NIAC. However they do not address the 
complications arising from the distinction between peace and war, and the applicable legal 
regimes. The major impact of the inflexible and formal thresholds and slow trigger of IHL is 
that it leaves those realities that merit IHL application only covered by national law and 
International Human Rights Law. This argument is in part based on the position that IHRL is 
not suitable to deal with the specifics and exigencies of armed conflict, where IHL is lex 
specialis. 
IHL is specifically designed to regulate conflict and many of the provisions governing the 
conduct of hostilities could never have a place in Human Rights law and in places, such as 
the right to life vs the right to kill the enemy, the two regimes outright contradict each other. 
However a major theme of this paper has been the hindering of the object and purpose of 
IHL. While full and equal regulation of the myriad of scenarios and realities of armed conflict 
would be ideal, the priority is the mitigation of suffering in war. There is a growing view that 
IHRL actually offers greater protection to the individual and so there is some ground to shift 
the regulation from IHL to IHRL.
124
 This section will explore the notion of using human 
rights to protect the victims of conflicts, as human rights law makes no distinction between 
classes of conflict, nor requires a threshold to apply. 
The European Court’s New Approach. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has dealt with cases where it applied its own 
doctrines to conflict situations, drawing primarily on IHRL and in some ways conflicting 
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with International Humanitarian Law.
125
 This approach of the ECtHR could trigger a re-
evaluation of strict adherence to the lex specialis doctrine
126
 and has the potential to impact 
the approach to regulating NIACs. While this approach needs to be examined more and 
calibrated further it shows an interesting, potentially very effective, and holistic approach to 
dealing with the regulation of NIACs as part of international law, rather than getting mired in 
overly detailed distinctions between systems of law. 
The ECtHR approach in a number of cases of has resulted in the court applying its own 
human rights doctrines on the use of force in law enforcement to large scale battles. The 
result is that the court breaks from tradition and applies IHRL directly to scenarios 
resembling armed conflict and without deference to International Humanitarian Law required 
under the lex specialis doctrine.
127
 
In Isayeva II
128
 the ECtHR considered an armed conflict without deferring to IHL. It equally 
was able to implement a new approach to conflict regulation, one which IHL could not. In 
this case it was discussing a battle between Russian armed forces and over 1000 insurgents. 
Following International Humanitarian Law this would first have to be classified as either an 
internal disturbance (rendering it inapplicable), or as an internal conflict under CA 3 or AP II. 
In this case however the court characterised it as “an active resistance to law enforcement 
bodies”.129 This approach then allowed the court to criticise the armed forces for not showing 
the sufficient degree of caution. By classifying the conflict in the context of a law 
enforcement operation the court completely removed the divisions and showed that its rules 
made no distinction in in the law’s application between police, armed forces, rioters or rebels. 
Instead of a divided and layered system they applied IHRL as one all-encompassing body of 
law, which of course echoes the universality and fundamental nature of IHRL. 
The Court has analysed the conduct of hostilities in three separate conflicts in the three 
scenarios of differing intensities and has been able to apply the same doctrine, grounded in 
the right to life provision of Article 2 ECHR.
130
 It has kept its approach consistent throughout 
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the different conflicts which would all have been categorised as distinct, with distinct rules 
applicable, in International Humanitarian Law. 
There is also an advantage in this approach as not only does it eliminate the legal and 
technical problems of categorisation, and the imbalance of the protection, but also removes 
the political influence on classification. In each case the status of the conflict was contested 
or disputed by the State. Russia has refused to recognise a conflict in Chechnya, the same 
attitude was taken somewhat by UK regarding its struggle with the IRA. As we have seen not 
only can this denial of conflict be for the States advantage, but also a genuine political 
concern of legitimising rebels or admitting a loss of power by the State. Taking the approach 
of the ECtHR eliminates the need for States to accept the reality of the existence of an armed 
conflict. It enables the protection of victims in cases where there is foul play by the State and 
for the benevolent State to adhere to its obligations without legitimising its opponents or 
entering a new political and legal reality.  
The suitability of applying IHRL to armed conflicts could be doubted. Yet IHRL is not 
detached from the concept of intense violence and social breakdown. For example Article 2 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) while guaranteeing the right to life 
also provides the circumstances in which life may be taken: 
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
Note the specific reference to “riot and insurrection”, essentially the scenario that can stray 
across the demarcation line into a NIAC. Equally human rights have long been established to 
apply in times of war unless derogated from. 
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Then there is the question of bypassing the lex specialis doctrine. It is firmly established that 
Human Rights law should be interpreted in light of IHL in situations of armed conflict. The 
ICJ gave a clear statement of how the doctrine functions in the Nuclear weapons case: 
“The ICCPR doesn’t cease in times of war…. In principle the right to not arbitrarily be 
deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of 
life however then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus 
whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Art 6 of the ICCPR, can only be 
decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms 
of the covenant itself.”131 
However there is the option for the State to derogate from their human right obligations, in 
particular Article 2 ECHR in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, in times of 
war and public emergency.
132
 Why then has no State made a derogation of Article 2? It 
would seem logical that in the situation of a NIAC that the State would make full use of this 
derogation ability, bolstering its validity to use force both in IHL and IHRL and therefore 
clearly create the distinction between which regime it considers to be bound by. However due 
to largely political reasons, States do not like to declare states of emergency nor derogate 
from the “Right to life” article. Since there is no derogation from the more general law, 
thereby clearly indicating that they are operating completely under the more specific regime, 
it seems fair that the ECtHR would continue to apply its own IHRL doctrines to these 
scenarios.
133
 Additionally States have even defended their actions under Article 2.2(a) and 
(c), therefore implying that that Article was applicable in the scenarios that could be 
construed as armed conflict. 
Equally the rationale behind the lex specialis doctrine is that IHL has more specific rules 
appropriate to the situation. But this is not the case in NIACs where the applicable law is 
often only CA 3. Considering that human rights instruments contain provisions on due 
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process
134
 and anti- discrimination of their rights “on any grounds of sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status”,135 it is hard to see how the applicable IHL 
is more specific than the human rights regime. 
Further support for the relevance of IHRL in the regulation of armed conflict can be taken 
from the preamble of APII, where in paragraph 3 the states recognise: 
“in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the 
protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”136 
And the Martens Clause seems particularly relevant in the light of the rules governing 
NIACS:  
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think 
it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations 
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, 
as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of 
humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.”137  
The value of turning to IHRL in internal conflict can also be seen in its application by States. 
In some areas routine compliance with IHRL has been achieved, with strong regional and 
national regimes established to enforce human rights. There are binding courts and 
enforcement measures, and often a constitutional standing of human rights norms,
138
 along 
with a strong desire and expectation of adhering to human rights norms being held by States 
and citizens alike. This strong adherence to its provisions can bolster the suitability of IHRL 
as having a role in internal conflict regulation. 
While more a thought exercise than a call to abandon IHL in favour of a new regime, 
considering the role of human rights in conflict regulation can result in interesting protections 
and solutions to the gaps in the law. Human Rights can escape the legalistic definitional trap 
that International Humanitarian Law must contend with. Due to the universality of human 
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rights, their application (if not contested by lex specialis) is not dependent on any 
classification between peace and war, or between internal or internationalised conflict and 
may provide a stronger and more effective regime at regulating and enforcing protection in 
NIACS.  
VIII. Conclusion 
International Humanitarian Law is a regime that has at its core distinctions and classifications 
while its object and purpose is universal in nature: to reduce suffering in war. The categories 
of conflict that the law seeks to distinguish are not consonant with the realities of modern 
war. Means and methods of warfare have evolved. The politics of warfare too have evolved. 
Ultimately war has shifted from an interstate affair to a model of global operations or internal 
strife. While the protections that IHL provides are evolving to match this shift, the persistence 
of the distinction between IAC and NIAC is a hindrance to the full implementation of these 
protections. The rise of the Internationalised Armed Conflict has called in to question the 
relevance and suitability of the current dichotomy. And the imposed irreconcilability between 
the two has left a patchwork of norms and convoluted tests, leaving the task of conflict 
classification slow, retroactive and unclear for both lawyers and those on the ground. 
The strict adherence to the distinction between peace time and wartime has also worked 
against the object and purpose of IHL. An overly formalised test limited to two factors and an 
obsession over the demarcation point between internal disturbance and armed conflict has 
rendered the law inflexible, unable to see the suffering of those who witness insufficiently 
organised violence. 
However the law is adapting. Custom is slowly spreading deep roots throughout the regime, 
paying no mind to arbitrary distinction. Judges are attempting to implement the law in 
accordance with its object and purpose, and States too are electing to look at the modern 
reality of war and suffering.  
The arena of war International Humanitarian Law governs is chaotic and violent with 
suffering and death as central elements, any attempt to regulate such a field must be firmly 
rooted in that reality and take account of its objective before being mired in arbitrary, 
politicised and dated distinctions and classifications.   
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